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Penalty Discount Rate: II 
A number of  economic policymakers and 
analysts have urged the Federal Reserve to 
maintain its discount rate (the rate it charges 
banks to borrow reserves) at a penalty level 
above the Federal funds rate (the cost of 
borrowing reserves in the private financial 
market). These analysts expect this approach 
to improve Federal Reserve monetary con-
trol, since borrowed reserves would be kept 
at low levels. This step consequently would 
prevent borrowed reserves, and therefore the 
money supply, from exacerbating inflation 
and business-cycle fluctuations. Our last 
Weekly Letter discussed these arguments as 
well as evidence of monetary-control errors 
occurring since October 1979, when the Fed 
began placing greater emphasis on bank re-
serves in the monetary-control process. This 
week we explain some of the disadvantages 
of a penalty discount rate for monetary con-
trol under present institutional arrangements. 
lagged reserve accounting 
One institutional change required for a 
penalty rate is a switch from the Federal 
Reserve's lagged reserve-requirement rule to 
a system of contemporaneous reserve re-
quirements. The lagged rule states that, in any 
given week, institutions with reservable de-
posits must hold reserves (as deposits at a 
Federal Reserve Bank or vault cash) in pre-
scribed percentages of  their various types of 
deposits outstanding two weeks earlier. This 
rule has been in effect since 1968, replacing 
the earlier system of contemporaneous re-
serve accounting, which required banks to 
hold reserves based on the current week's 
deposits. 
To understand how reserve-requirement 
rules affect the choice of a discount-rate 
policy, we must understand how the Fed 
exercises control over the monetary aggre-
gates. Through its rules, the Fed sets thedollar 
volume of reserve requirements equal to 
fixed percentages of  the various types of 
deposits issued by depository institutions. 
Thus if  the Fed fixes the quantity of  total 
reserves available to the banking system, 
bank deposits can expand only to some fixed 
level. (By "bank," we mean all depository 
institutions with transaction accounts.) If de-
posits expanded beyond that fixed level, total 
reserve requirements would exceed the total 
quantity of reserves available to meet those 
requirements. Thus some individual banks 
would find themselves without enough re-
serves to meet their requirements. These 
banks would respond by bidding for reserves 
from other banks in the Federal-funds market, 
causing the funds rate to rise. That rate in-
crease would induce banks to supply-and 
the public to demand -fewer  deposits. At the 
appropriate funds rate, System-wide deposits 
and reserve requirements would fall enough 
to eliminate the System-wide reserve 
deficiency. 
Under lagged accounting, the link between 
current deposits and required reserves is 
broken. Banks enter any given week with an 
unchangeable quantity of required reserves. 
Unless the Fed wanted to force some indi-
vidual banks into a deficiency, it must pro-
vide the quantity of reserves needed by the 
banking system. Thus the Fed's supply of 
reserves must adjust to the banking system's 
demand. 
Can the Fed use reserves to control the mon-
etary aggregates under this system of ac-
counting? The answer is yes under certain 
circumstances, which depend on the level of 
reserves which banks borrow from the Fed, 
and thus on discount-rate policy. The Fed has 
two basic methods of  supplying reserves. The 
System supplies nonborrowed reserves when 
it purchases a Treasury bill or other security 
directly or indirectly from a bank, paying for 
the security with reserves (in the form of a 
deposit at the Fed). The Fed supplies bor-
rowed reserves when it makes a loan to a 
depository institution at the discount rate. 
Banks are reluctant to borrow from the dis-
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count window, however. The Fed generally 
discourages such loans except in emergen-
cies, and moreover, it imposes restrictions on 
the size and frequency of borrowing. 
With banks reluctant to borrow, the Fed thus 
can restrict money growth by providing a 
larger proportion of banks' predetermined 
requirements through the discount window 
and a lower proportion through open-market 
operations. The Fed achieves a more expan-
sionary policy by shifting the split more in 
favor of non  borrowed reserves. This ap-
proach to monetary control would obviously 
break down under a penalty discount rate, 
since borrowed reserves would always be 
nearly zero. As a consequence, the spl it be-
tween borrowed and non  borrowed reserves 
would always be set around 100-percent 
nonborrowed/zero-percent borrowed, and 
therefore could not be manipulated for  . 
monetary-control purposes. 
Uniform reserve requirements 
If lagged reserve requ i  rements represent such 
a problem, why not switch simultaneously to 
both contemporaneous accounting and a 
penalty rate? For one reason, the switch in 
accounting rules would impose added costs 
on commercial banks. In addition, there 
would be technical monetary-control prob-
lems resulting from differences in reserve-
requirement ratios on the various categories 
of bank deposits. Ideally, reserve require-
ments would be applied uniformly to all 
deposits included in the money-supply mea-
sure the Fed  is most interested in controlling, 
and wou  Id be held at zero on the types 
of deposits the Fed is less interested in 
controlling. 
Unfortunately, this is currently not the case. 
The Fed now pays most attention to M 1-B-
currency plus bank checking-account bal-
ances plus NOW and other interest-bearing 
checkable deposits. It imposes certain re-
serve-requirement ratios on checking ac-
counts, graduated upward according to the 
volume of deposits, but imposes lower re-
quirements on interest-bearing checkable 
deposits. (Furthermore, reserves are required 
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against various types of  time and savings 
deposits not included in M1-B.) As noted 
below, a new structure of reserve require-
ments is being phased in over the 1980-87 
period, in line with the stipulations of the 
Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
To achieve its M 1-B targets, the Fed must 
provide a level of total reserves which satis-
fies the demand for required reserves to sup-
port the target level of M 1-B, plus any excess 
reserves; plus any reserves needed to support 
deposits not included in M 1-B. Choosing the 
appropriate reserves level for any monetary-
control period requires forecasting the "mul-
tipl ier" relationship between M 1-B and total 
bank reserves. This in turn requires forecast-
ing (1) the composition of M1-B with respect 
to NOW versus checking accounts, and 
checking accounts by size of bank, and (2) 
the levels of  the various reservable deposits 
not included in M 1-B. 
Assume for example that the public de-
cides to transfer funds from six-month 
money-market certificates (MMC) to pass-
book-savings accounts, neither of which are 
included in M 1-B. Since the MMC has a 
lower reserve requ i  rement than the passbook 
account, total reserves absorbed by non-
M 1-B deposits would rise-or the multiplier 
between M 1-B and total reserves would fall. 
If  the Fed did not anticipate the shift in deposit 
composition and did not provide the extra 
reserves, fewer reserves would be available 
to support M 1-B. Some individual banks 
would find themselves with reserve deficien-
cies. They might try first to borrow reserves 
from other banks in the Federal-funds market. 
This would drive the funds rate up, causing 
M 1-B to fall below target because of  a decline 
. in the money multiplier. 
Discount-rate policy strongly affects the ex-
tent to which the funds rate would rise and 
M 1-B would fall short of its target. First as-
sume that the discount rate is held constant 
and at a below-market level. As the funds rate 
begins to rise relative to the discount rate, 
more and more banks will be induced to 
borrow extra reserves at the now relatively less expensive discount rate. The increase in 
reserves will be used to satisfy the increased 
need for reserves caused by the shift in depos-
it composition and by the lower money mu 1-
tiplier. This increase in total reserves relative 
to their originally targeted path means a smal-
ler decl i  ne in M 1-B below its target level than 
wou  Id otherwise be the case. Thus the de-
cline in the money multiplier caused by the 
deposit-composition shift is offset to some 
extent by an increase in total reserves relative 
to their original path-an amount provided 
through the disco,unt window. Our last 
Weekly Letter showed that such offsets be-
tween multiplier errors and total reserve er-
rors are quite important in practice. 
If a penalty discount rate were maintained, 
the automatic stabilizer of M 1-B around its 
target could not operate. With the discount 
rate always above the funds rate, borrowings 
from the discount window would be pegged 
at nearly zero levels. Thus the extra reserves 
necessary to stabilize M1-B would not be 
provided through the window. 
Double-edged sword 
The Fed's monetary control can be improved 
when shifts in deposit composition are auto-
matically accommodated by borrowed re-
serves. This can be a double-edged sword, 
however. Borrowing also accommodates 
other factors which the Fed does not want to 
accommodate, such as a larger than desired 
change in GNP. For example, higher GNP 
causes the publ  ic'  s demand for money to rise. 
Banks' attempts to borrow the associated 
extra reserves in the Federal-funds market 
cause the funds rate to rise, inducing banks to 
borrow reserves instead at the discount win-
dow. The extra reserves su pport the increased 
deposits, and M 1-B thus overshoots its target. 
Through this process, the Fed can inadver-
tently intensify business-cycle fluctuations by 
providing a higher money supply when in-
come is rising. 
The advisability of using a penalty discount 
rate under contemporaneous accounting 
thus depends on the relative predictability of 
factors the Fed needs to accommodate (i.e., 
deposit-composition shifts) versus those the 
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Fed needs to offset (income and price move-
ments), in order to achieve the desired 
amou nt of  monetary control. A recent Federal 
Reserve study of the "New Monetary Control 
Procedures" indicates that a penalty discount 
rate would have a net disadvantage for mon-
etary control under the current nonuniform 
structure of reserve requirements. One-
month-ahead forecasts of the monetary ag-
gregates from two widely different money 
market models (one developed at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the other 
at the Federal Reserve Board) suggest that 
failure to use the discount window as a 
source of automatic changes in total reserves 
would have impaired monetary control over 
the October 1979-0ctober 1980 period. 
Both sets of results included forecasts of 
composition shifts, which the Fed should 
accommodate, as well as income move-
ments, which it shou Id not -and thus both 
addressed the issue of relative predictability. 
Monetary Control Act 
The effectiveness of a penalty discount rate 
will be increased with the full implementa-
tion of the Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
This Act will make reserve requirements sig-
nificantly more uniform. Bank and thrift-
institution transaction accounts (checking 
plus interest-bearing checkable) over $25 
million ultimately will have a uniform reserve 
requ i  rement of 12 percent, wh  i Ie those under 
$25 million will have a 3-percent require-
ment. No reserve requirements will be im-
posed on time and savings deposits, except 
fornonpersonal time and Eurocurrency 
deposits. 
Choosing the level of reserves necessary to 
hit a given M 1-B target thus will rely less 
heavily on estimates of deposit-composition 
shifts than is required under current reserve-
requirement rules. The new rules will not be 
completely phased-in until 1987, although 
mostofthe phase-in will be accomplished by 
1983. Thus for the next few years, problems 
of predicting deposit composition will pose a 
serious obstacle to the implementation of a 
penalty discount rate. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weeki'  Avera  es  y  g 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  }/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  }/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 























Change  Change from 
from  year ago 
1  0/14/8 i  Dollar  Percent 
- 87  10,641  7.5 
- 95  11,807  9.8 
- 469  4,534  12.9 
140  5,858  11.9 
- 2  691  - 2.9 
151  476  40.2 
13  1,093  - 16.4 
- 5  - 69  - 0.4 
-2,685  - 4,947  - 11.2 
-1,974  - 5,575  - 16.7 
- 145  - 566  - 1.9 
- 327  20,433  31.3 
- .295  21,324  37.7 
456  8,985  36.8 
Weekended  Com  arable  P 
10/14/81  year-ago period 
81  44 
13  146 
68  101 
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